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BETTER-OFF WALKING: WYOMING V. HOUGHTON
EXEMPLIFIES WHAT ACEVEDO FAILED TO RECTIFY
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years the United States Supreme Court attempted to
produce bright-line rules governing the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. However, the Court's
numerous, often confusing decisions in the past eight decades served
only to blur those lines. With each attempt to fashion rules that
would be workable for both law enforcement in application and
lower courts in administration, citizens' Fourth Amendment rights
were narrowed.' Each time the Court attempted to clarify a rule, it
expanded police power to conduct virtually limitless warrantless
searches, consistently eviscerating personal privacy rights.2 The
result is an exception originally intended to be narrowly tailored
that has strained, then surpassed, its original justifications and now
threatens to eliminate the application of the Fourth Amendment's
protections within the confines of automobiles.3
The Court recently redefined the scope of warrantless automobile
searches in Wyoming v. Houghton' by announcing that police
officers who have probable cause to search a car may also inspect all
parts of and containers in the vehicle, including passengers'
belongings, that are capable of holding the object of the general
search.5 Prior to Houghton, the desire was to prevent a situation
where police officers' specific probable cause with respect to a single
item or individual required them to conduct broader warrantless
1. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only
to a container within the vehicle); Dunawayv. NewYork, 442 U.S. 200,213-14 (1979) (stating
that a single understandable rule is necessary to provide police officers guidance in making
quick decisions while carrying out their duties).
2. See generally Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (holding that 'the police may search an
automobile and the containers within it, where they have probable cause to believe
contraband or evidence is contained"); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding
that police may conduct a search of an automobile "that is as thorough as a magistrate could
authorize in a warrant").
3. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) (stating that exceptions to the
warrant requirement must be carefully drawn, the purpose of which is to restrain police
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of combating crime); see also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347,357 (1967) (holding that warrantless searches were per se unreasonable
unless they fit within a well-drawn exception). Katz represents the Court's original
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See id.
4. 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
5. See id. at 1304.
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vehicle searches in order to justify the specific aim of the search.6
The Houghton decision, however, clearly eradicates that sought-
after privacy protection by authorizing broad warrantless searches
of the entire vehicle and all its contents, regardless of ownership.7
The decision, the majority felt, was clearly in line with, and
moreover, was dictated by, precedent that stretched back to the
creation of the automobile exception itself.8
This note first discusses the creation and evolution of the
automobile exception. Second, it sets out the facts and holding in
Houghton. Next, it analyzes the holding in light of precedent and its
application. Finally, the note discusses the potential ramifications
and an actual misapplication of the Houghton rule.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment9 was created
to act as a prophylactic device, placing a neutral judiciary between
police and citizens, restraining police action and protecting citizens'
rights under the Fourth Amendment before the intrusion is
completed. ° The prior review requirement by a neutral judiciary
places limits on a concentration of executive power over citizens that
prevents overly intrusive searches from occurring." Additionally,
prior judicial review serves to "prevent hindsight from coloring the
evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure." 2 Justice
Stewart commented: "we cannot accept the view that Fourth
Amendment interests are vindicated so long as 'the rights of the
6. See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565.
7. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1303.
8. See id. at 1299-1301.
9. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886) (stating
that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in court).
10. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978) (stating that the majority of Fourth
Amendment protection is within the warrant requirement clause); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-07 (1965) (discussing the main purpose of a search warrant);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (explaining the purpose for arrest warrants).
11. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
12. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976).
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criminal' are 'protect[ed]... against introduction of evidence seized
without probable cause.' The Amendment is designed to prevent, not
simply to redress, unlawful police action." 3 As a result, any
exceptions to the Amendment were to be narrowly tailored'4 to
accomplish the limited societal goals that created the need for
exceptions. 5 The burden is on the party seeking application of an
exception to show the necessity of its application.'
A. Creation of the Automobile Exception
In Carroll v. United States the Court first recognized a distinc-
tion in the requisite evaluation for warrants in homes and in cars
resulting in the creation of an exception for automobiles and other
movable vessels.'" The Court found that ready mobility of vehicles
13. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969) (alteration in original) (quoting
the dissenting opinion); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court has recognized the importance of the warrant requirement
as a "bulwark against police practices that prevail in totalitarian regimes"). Justice Stevens
also stated that the warrant requirement reflects sound policy judgment that without exigent
circumstances, the decision to intrude on an individual's privacy is best placed in the hands
of a neutral third party. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). But see Acevedo, 500
U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the law explaining the reasonable expectation
of privacy appears to have been developed as a means of creating exceptions to the rules).
Justice Scalia noted that one commentator listed close to twenty exceptions, including:
searches incident to arrest, border searches, administrative searches of nonregulated
businesses, exigent circumstances, search incident to nonarrest if probable cause supported
an arrest, boat boarding document checks, welfare searches, inventory and airport searches,
as well as school searches. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Craig M. Bradley, Two
Models of the FourthAmendment, 83 MICH. L.REv. 1468,1473-74 (1985) (footnotes omitted)).
The Court has since added two more exceptions: searches of offices of government employees,
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), and mobile home searches, California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386 (1985).
15. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (stating that exceptions to the
warrant requirement were to extend only as far as necessary to accomplish the limited
societal needs that initially created the exception); see also Lewis R. Katz, United States v.
Ross: Evolving Standards for Warrantless Searches, 74 J. CRfI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172, 186
n.93 (explaining that limiting warrantless searches was the intent of the Framers who, in
constructing the Amendment, were suspicious of government intrusions into the lives of the
citizenry absent previous judicial review). For a discussion of the colonial history of the
warrant requirement, whichis beyond the scope ofthis note, see Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking
the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603, 617, 620 (1982).
16. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
17. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
18. See id. at 153 (emphasizing the impracticability of obtaining a warrant for a vessel
that is readily mobile and can disappear before a warrant is issued); see also South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S 364, 367 (1976) (stating that due to ready mobility of vehicles,
stringent application of the warrant requirement is practically impossible); Chambers v.
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and the exigency of circumstances to search and seize contraband
dictated the use of a more relaxed reasonableness standard. 9 This
exigency permitted police to conduct warrantless vehicle searches
if they had probable cause to stop the vehicle without offending the
Fourth Amendment. ° In subsequent decisions, a majority of the
Court observed that there is a reduced expectation of privacy within
a vehicle,2' but remained reluctant to expand that rationale to allow
searches of containers within locked compartments in vehicles.22
While the decision in Carroll addressed the general applicability of
the exception, it failed to define the proper scope of such a
warrantless search in a vehicle.23
B. Expanding the Exception
1. Container in the Car Searches
The Court eventually grew cognizant of the potential for expan-
sion of the automobile exception beyond its original justifications for
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (explaining that the window of opportunity to search a
movable vessel is brief). The vehicle in Chambers had been seized prior to the search,
removing exigency, but the Court reasoned that there is little difference between seizing
and/or detaining a vehicle while waiting for a warrant and conducting an immediate search
pending issuance of a warrant. See id.
19. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. Subsequent cases make clear that Carroll was not based
on sheer exigency because once a vehicle has been stopped, there is no real danger that the
vehicle will exit the jurisdiction and be outside its warrant authority. See Chambers, 399 U.S.
at 62-64. In Chambers the Court wrote:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand
seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 52; see also Jeffrey 0. Himstreet, Note, The Executive's War on Crime Takes a Bite out
of Privacy in California v. Acevedo, 28 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 195, 197 (1991).
20. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149, 162 (finding that prohibition officers had probable cause
to believe the car contained bootleg liquor and conducted a warrantless search that involved
removal of seat upholstery to locate the object of the search).
21. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) (stating that the
expectation of privacy is reduced in vehicles because the vehicles are used as a method of
transportation, rather than as a storage area for personal effects, and because the vehicle
travels public roads with its occupants and contents in full view). But see infra notes 29 and
32 (explaining that reduced expectation of privacy pertains primarily to the vehicle itself, not
to the contents within it).
22. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1(1977). Both Sanders and Chadwick were overruled by California v. Acevedo. See Acevedo,
500 U.S. at 579.
23. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799-800 (1982).
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application. The Court drew a constitutional line in United States v.
Chadwick,' holding that police conducting a warrantless search of
a locked container within a vehicle under the authority of the
automobile exception violated the Fourth Amendment even though
the police had probable cause to believe the container contained
contraband. 5 In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents had probable
cause to believe that a 200 pound double-locked footlocker contained
marijuana.2 ' The agents, however, developed this probable cause
prior to the time the locker was placed in the car. Instead of
stopping the suspect and seizing the container, the agents waited to
seize and search it after the suspect placed the locker into the trunk
of a car.2' The probable cause in question pertained only to the
container and not to the car itself. The majority reasoned that
probable cause to search the car was insufficient because there was
a heightened expectation of privacy in the luggage in question, more
so than the privacy interest in the car itself.
29
The Court seemed settled in this limitation on the automobile
exception when it announced its decision inArkansas v. Sanders,
30
again stating that a warrantless search of a container in an
automobile violated the Fourth Amendment since probable cause
did not extend to the container.31 Any sacrifice of privacy pertained
only to that expectation in the vehicle, not to the containers within
it, regardless of the type of container in question.32
24. 433 U.S. 1 (1977); see also Sanders, 442 U.S. at 773 (finding that federal narcotics
agents had probable cause to believe that defendant's footlocker, located in car trunk
contained marijuana).
25. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13-14. Later the Court indicated that the whole vehicle
could be searched, just not containers within it. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766; see also South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,366 (1978) (finding that search based on probable cause
permits search of locked glove compartment); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975)
(permitting warrantless search of entire passenger area); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
44 (1974) (involving a hidden dash compartment); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 437
(1973) (holding that search of locked trunk of car was not unreasonable); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132,136 (1925) (finding that police were permitted to remove seat upholstery
while conducting a warrantless search to locate the object of the search).
26. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 3.
27. See id. at 4.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 12-13; cf. supra note 19 (discussing the Court's holding in Chambers that
once probable cause has attached to search a vehicle, it is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment to search the vehicle immediately or to seize it and wait for a search warrant).
30. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
31. See id. at 763-64.
32. See id. at 765 n.13. The Court intimated that all containers did not receive the same
level of constitutional protection. For example, the container may not show an expectation
of privacy if the contents are determinable by their packaging. Justice Powell predicted this
2000]
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In Sanders, the police had probable cause to believe that the
suspect's suitcase contained illegal drugs. 31 Similar to Chadwick, the
officers waited until the luggage was placed into the trunk of a taxi
before stopping the car and searching the suitcase.34 By the
extension of the Chadwick rule's privacy protection to a container
actually being transported in a vehicle, the container could be seized
but not opened without a warrant since the automobile exception
does not extend to personal luggage." An expectation of privacy in
containers, the majority reasoned, is not diminished by placing them
in a car. In fact, in both Chadwick and Sanders, the Court deter-
mined that exigency was lacking when the object of the search was
a container that could easily be seized pending the issuance of a
search warrant.36
The privacy-conscious standard that denied the automobile
exception's application to containers located in vehicles, first
announced in Chadwick, stood for only five years. 7 During that
short time, both law enforcement and lower courts found the
standard difficult to administer. Furthermore, the Court purported
to adhere to the exigency rationale, 39 but there appeared to be a
growing willingness to expand the exception.4"
Shortly after its decision in Sanders, the Court added another
exception to the warrant requirement, the search incident to arrest,
rule would result in difficulty in determining which containers were entitled to full protection
that would lead to incessant litigation. See id.
33. See id. at 755.
34. See id.
35. See Himstreet, supra note 19, at 199.
36. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12.
37. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), blurred the Chadwick-Sanders rule by
announcing that if probable cause attached to search the vehicle, all its contents were
searchable. See id. at 824. If probable cause attached to a container, a warrant was required
to search or open the container. See id.
38. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1174 n.3, 1175 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(Tamm, J., dissenting).
39. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,424-25 (1981) (plurality opinion) (explaining
that the mobility justification and reduced expectation of privacy are not applicable rationales
in reference to containers). Justice Stewart's plurality opinion questioned the applicability
of the rationale, since what one may place in a suitcase another may put in a paper sack. See
id. at 426-27. Despite the fact that Robbins extended constitutional protection to paper bags,
lower courts were reluctant to implement it. See State v. Olsen, 315 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1982)
(upholding warrantless search of paper sack under Carroll rather than applying the unclear
precedent fromRobbins); see also Anthony E. Kaplan, Note, DrawingLines around theFourth
Amendment: Robbins v. California and New York v. Belton, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 483 (1982).
40. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that police who have
probable cause to arrest a suspect may search all areas of an automobile incident to arrest).
334
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when it announced its decision in New York v. Belton.41 According
to the Court in Belton, the permissible scope of a vehicle search
initiated incident to lawful arrest includes any container found in
the car.42 One of the principal rationales supporting car searches
incident to arrest is that the arrestee may reach into the car and
gain possession of a weapon or other criminal evidence that could be
destroyed.' In part, the Belton decision was based on the under-
standing that containers found in the narrow confines of the
passenger compartment were within the potential control of all the
vehicle's occupants, not just the driver.'
With this groundwork laid, the Court, in United States v. Ross,"5
similarly defined the scope of a warrantless vehicle search. The
Court held that warrantless searches, based on probable cause
rather than exigency per se, also permitted warrantless searches of
containers found in cars if there was probable cause to believe the
vehicle contained contraband, thereby expanding the exception.46
The scope ofwarrantless searches of this kind is neither broader nor
narrower than could be judicially authorized in a warrant.47 The
Court concluded that the warrant process would be misdirected if
police were permitted to search an automobile from top to bottom
until they happened upon a container that more likely than not held
the object of their general search, at which point officers would have
to obtain a warrant before proceeding.'3 Rather, car searches based
on probable cause are designed to prevent the loss or further
concealment of criminal evidence.49
While the Court abolished Chadwick's container/car distinction, 0
it did not directly overrule Chadwick or Sanders since a warrant
was still required to search a container if probable cause extended
41. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
42. See id. at 460.
43. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 227.
44. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
45. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
46. See id. at 800. The Court based its decision on the same factors considered in all
vehicle searches: ready vehicle mobility and a reduced expectation of privacy. See id. at 806-
07, 823-25. See also Cardwel v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) (finding
that the reduced expectation of privacy results from pervasive governmental regulation of
vehicles and the privilege of driving them).
47. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
48. See id. at 815-16, 818 n.21.
49. See id. at 806-07.
50. See id. at 823.
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only to the container.5' The exigency rationale was not abandoned
though, as the Ross majority intimated that the same exigency that
attached to a movable vehicle also attached to a movable container
within that vehicle. 2 In deference to the Chadwick-Sanders
precedent, the Court chose not to address that issue. 5
Thus, the decision in Ross required interpretation of a confusing
line of precedent from which to choose: whether to apply the Carroll
doctrine that permitted a general vehicle search if police had
probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband or the
Chadwick doctrine that governed luggage-type searches where
probable cause only extended to the container. The Ross Court took
the first crucial step by clarifying that closed containers in vehicles
could be searched without a warrant based on their presence in the
car. 4 In fact, the Ross dissenters, addressing the remnants of
Chadwick, questioned why a suitcase is per se more private or
harder to store, or for any other reason more deserving of warrant
requirement protection than containers discovered in a general
probable cause search of an entire vehicle.55 That question was
answered in California v. Acevedo56 when the Court took the next
crucial step by overruling Sanders and the remnants of Chadwick.7
One of the primary purposes for decidingAcevedo was to prevent
a situation where police with less probable cause were justified in
conducting a more intrusive general search.58 When the Court
specifically addressed the question on facts analogous to Ross, the
'majority "recognized 'the anomalous nature' of the dichotomy"
created by the Ross and Chadwick holdings.59 In response, the
exception was extended to all containers in vehicles.6" The Court
reasoned:
51. See id. at 824. The decision not to wholly overrule Sanders may have been an attempt
at preserving some aspect of personal privacy. What resulted, though, was confusion as to
which precedent applied, Sanders or Ross. See Himstreet, supra note 19, at 201.
52. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 809.
53. See id. at 824; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991).
54. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 823; see also Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572.
55. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 834 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Chadwick, 433 U.S. at
20-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
57. See id. at 579.
58. See id. at 575.
59. Id. at 568.
60. See id. at 574.
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The line between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause
to search a package in that vehicle is not always clear, and separate
rules that govern the two objects to be searched may enable the police
to broaden their power to make warrantless searches and disserve
privacy interests."'
Further, the Court saw no benefit to a set of rules where "'fortuitous
circumstances... control the outcome' of various searches."62
The majority stated that Ross permitted specific container
searches to prevent a situation where police have probable cause to
search a container but feel compelled to search the entire car to
qualify under the automobile exception.63 In all vehicle searches,
whether the general search reveals a container or whether the
container is itself the object of the search, as long as the search was
prefaced by probable cause, the search falls within the automobile
exception and does not require a search warrant.64 In a search
where probable cause extends only to a container found in a vehicle,
a warrantless search is permissible if there is specific probable
cause to believe that it holds contraband.65
Perhaps attempting to lessen the impact of the new rule, the
majority reaffirmed that if probable cause was localized to a specific
area in the car and a search of that area revealed a container, the
search of the container was permitted without a warrant, but the
search could go no further than the original probable cause
dictated.66 Nevertheless, the Court felt that in the balance of the
need for practical law enforcement rules and citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights, the need for the bright-line rule prevailed.67
That bright-line rule, despite its desire to prevent more intrusive
searches, militated in favor of law enforcement.
With the new container rule, the question remained as to whether
it would prove a clarification of anomalous precedent and actually
limit the scope of warrantless searches in situations where police
had specific or individualized probable cause. Previously, each
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 578 (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 22).
63. See id. at 580.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 580-81; Himstreet, supra note 19, at 204-05. But see Acevedo, 500 U.S. at
587 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating it is better for police to be burdened than citizens).
20001 337
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attempt at clarification by the Court seemed to produce more
uncertainty as to the application and extent of each rule.6" Since it
was clear to the Acevedo majority that past rules had resulted in
greater losses of citizens' personal privacy, would the new rule serve
to preserve a modicum of personal privacy? Since the new rule
permitted warrantless searches of the vehicle and closed containers
within it, would this apply to all property belonging to all vehicle
occupants? The Court answered these questions with a resounding
"yes" when it announced its decision in Wyoming v. Houghton.69
III. FACTS, LOWER COURT DISPOSITION, AND HOLDING OF
WYOMING V. HOUGHTON
Wyoming Highway Patrol initiated a lawful traffic stop of a
vehicle for speeding and a broken brake light in the early morning
hours of July 23, 1995.70 There were three passengers-the driver,
David Young, the driver's girlfriend, and respondent Sandra
Houghton.7 When the officers noticed a syringe in Young's pocket,
he admitted that "he used it to take drugs." 2
All three occupants were ordered out of the car, placed in the
custody of another officer, and then "patted down" for weapons and
contraband." When the pat down failed to yield any contraband, the
police searched the passenger compartment for additional drugs,
finding a purse behind the area where Houghton and the other
female passenger had been sitting. 4 Houghton admitted that the
purse belonged to her.7 Without further- comment, the officer
searched the purse and removed a brown pouch that contained drug
paraphernalia, a syringe containing liquid, and a black wallet-like
68. See cases cited supra notes 18 and 22. For example, the vehicle in California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), was a mobile home. The Court found the exception extended to
searches of such movable vessels because of the same exigency rationale that applied to a two-
door sedan. See id. at 393-94.
69. 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
70. See id. at 1299.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363,365 (Wyo. 1998). The Wyoming Supreme Court
found that there was "no reasonable basis for the pat down search of the passengers." Id. at
365 n.1.
74. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299.
75. See id.
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container, also containing drug paraphernalia, a vial, and another
syringe.
7 6
The officer took custody of the two containers and returned the
purse to the car.77 Houghton was then arrested for possession of a
controlled substance and charged with felony possession ofmetham-
phetamine.78 The driver and other passenger were released.79
Prior to trial, Houghton filed a motion to suppress all evidence
from the purse, alleging the search violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, arguing that there was no probable cause
to search her belongings. ° The district court, relying on Acevedo,
denied the motion, finding that the officers had probable cause to
search the entire car for contraband, including a search of all
containers within it that were capable of concealing the particular
contraband.8 " The jury convicted Houghton as charged.82
On appeal, the question before the Wyoming Supreme Court was
"whether the personal belongings of a passenger may be searched
under the 'automobile exception' when probable cause exists to
search the automobile, but there is no probable cause to believe the
passenger is involved in criminal activity."83 Houghton asserted
that, even though there was probable cause to search the car, "the
search of her purse violated her justifiable expectation of privacy in
her personal belongings." 4 The State asserted that police have "no
duty to determine probable cause as to each container within the
car, and consequently the permissible scope of the search included
the search of all containers." 5
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court, stating
that even though the police had probable cause to search the car and
thus were entitled to search the containers within, police could not
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1300.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 366 (Wyo. 1998).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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search such containers if they knew or should have known the
container belonged to a nonsuspect passenger unless the driver-
suspect had an opportunity to conceal contraband within it.86 This
"notice test," traditionally applied in the context of searches of
dwellings, was based on the Supreme Court's preference for
individualized suspicion coupled with a balancing of "the legitimate
interests of both the individual and law enforcement.""7 Based on
this new "passenger's property" rule, the Wyoming Supreme Court
found the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
because the police knew the purse did not belong to the driver, had
no probable cause to suspect Houghton of any criminal activity, and
lacked probable cause to believe the driver had placed contraband
in the purse.8"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the Wyoming Supreme Court. 9 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, held that a warrantless police search of an automobile
based on probable cause permits a search of any "passenger's
belongings found in the car that are capable of [holding or] conceal-
ing the object of the search" which in this case was drugs.9°
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court reached a constitutional crossroad when it
again was faced with defining the permissible scope of a search
under the automobile exception in Houghton: whether the rule in
Ross, subsequently expanded in Acevedo, permits warrantless
searches of passengers' belongings "capable of concealing the object
of the search" found in an automobile when police have probable
cause to search the vehicle. 9' Making its determination, the Court
set forth a two-prong analysis to decide whether a government
action violates the Fourth Amendment. First, the Court asked
whether the search or seizure would have been considered unlawful
86. See id. at 372.
87. Id. at 369-70.
88. See id. at 372.
89. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1304 (1999).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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at the time the Fourth Amendment was framed.9 2 If no answer is
found there, an evaluation must be made using traditional reason-
ableness standards that balance the degree of the act's intrusion on
personal privacy against the degree to which the act was necessary
to further a legitimate government interest.
93
The Court, finding the police action in this case passed both
prongs of the analysis, decided that the rule in Ross also permitted
warrantless searches of passengers' belongings in a vehicle. 94 The
Court, first examining the roots of the automobile exception in
Carroll,95 found that general probable cause existed to believe the
car in Houghton contained contraband.96 It also relied on Ross's
general rule that "the permissible scope of a warrantless car search
'is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there
is probable cause to believe that it will be found."'9
The Court, perhaps unconvinced by the satisfaction of the first
prong of this test, went on to the second prong of the
analysis-balancing the personal privacy interest against the
government interest in effective law enforcement. It found the
balance tipped in favor of the government.9 The Court reasoned
that passengers have the same reduced expectation of privacy as do
92. See id. at 1300 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) and California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)).
93. See id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995)). But see
supra note 73. The Wyoming Supreme Court found that there was "no reasonable basis for
the pat down search of the passengers." Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363,365 n.1 (Wyo. 1998).
Thus, it seems uncertain whether the search in Houghton actually furthered a legitimate
government interest.
94. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300-01 (discussing the interpretations of Ross in
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 571-72 (1991), stating that Ross applied broadly to all
containers, without qualification as to ownership; and United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478,
479-80 (1985), stating thatRoss permitted the search of any containers within a vehicle that
may hold the object of the search, based on their presence in the vehicle).
95. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300 (discussing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925)). The Carroll court concluded that such a search would have been reasonable at the
time of the framing of the Fourth Amendment in light ofcongressional legislation which gave
customs officials authorityto conduct warrantless searches of ships ifthey had probable cause
to believe they contained goods subject to a duty. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 151.
96. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300.
97. Id. at 1301 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824).
98. See id. at 1302. But see Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,433-34 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (finding that police time and expense in procuring a warrant may be justified by
the individual privacy interest that is protected as a result, but the sheer number of warrants
creates a higher aggregate burden that may not be justified by the protection of sometimes
trivial privacy interests).
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drivers.99 The majority found the Wyoming Supreme Court's
"passenger's property" rule unacceptable because it placed an
impractically high burden on law enforcement and would encourage
litigation.0 ° In rejecting this analysis, the majority stated that
practicalities in administration must be considered and found that
such practicalities "militate in favor of the needs of law enforcement,
and against a personal-privacy interest that is ordinarily weak,"'0 '
sounding the virtual death knell for citizens' privacy in an automo-
bile.
1. Search of Passengers' Belongings Is Historically Reasonable
The Court, apparently unwilling to address Acevedo's goal of
lessening the intrusive scope of automobile searches, based its
decision on Carroll and Ross. It concluded that probable cause
existed to believe that the car contained contraband, so the general
search was authorized.102 Based on the historical evidence those
cases relied upon, the majority felt the Framers would have deemed
a warrantless search of all containers in that vehicle reasonable.' 3
While the majority recognized thatRoss did not involve a passenger,
they found dispositive the fact that Ross did not limit its holding to
drivers only.' As a result, the Court reasoned that "[t]he critical
element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property
is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe
that the specific "things" to be searched for and seized are located on
the property to which entry is sought.'" 105 Police searches of the type
99. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302. But see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662
(1979) (noting that many automobile travelers feel more secure in cars than in other forms
of transportation).
100. See id. at 1303.
101. Id. But see id. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the State's
legitimate law enforcement interest can outweigh a serious privacy intrusion).
102. See id. at 1300.
103. See id.
104. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1301 (stating that if Ross was intended to be limited to
the facts of that case, involving only the driver, such limitation surely would have been
expressed in that holding). But see id. at 1305 & n.1 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens
expressed concern that the facts in Houghton were unlike precedent. Prior cases involved
situations where the defendant was the driver or where no question existed as to ownership
of the containers to be searched. See id.; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991);
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985); United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
105. Id. at 1301 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,556 (1978)). In Zurcher,
the issue before the court was the constitutionality of a search warrant directed at premises
belonging to one who was not suspected of any crime. The Court stated the most significant
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complained of in Houghton were likened to early customs searches
that did not require individualized probable cause for each
package." 6 This reasoning, though, appears strained since customs
officials conduct searches under limited circumstances, whereas
police searches are not so limited by time, place, or circumstance.
2. Interest in Law Enforcement Outweighs Personal Privacy
Interest
The majority, perhaps not convinced by the foregoing historical
analysis,0 7 balanced the relative interests, finding that the needs of
law enforcement must prevail.' ° The Court distinguished the search
from personal body searches, which receive heightened Fourth
Amendment protection,' °9 because traumatic consequences associ-
ated with body searches do not result from mere property
searches."0 Thus, the majority believes the expectation of personal
element of the reasonableness evaluation of a search is not based on suspicion that the owner
is a potential criminal, but rather that probable cause exists when the specific things to be
searched for are located on the property to be searched. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556; see also
Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 (noting that the scope of the search is defined by the object of the
search).
106. See Houghton, 119 S.Ct. at 1300-01 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 820 n.26); supra note
95 (discussing the creation of the exception in Carroll that the Houghton Court partially
relied upon). But see Chandlerv. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,308 (1997) (emphasizingindividualized
suspicion).
107. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1306 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argues that
Either the majority is unconvinced by its own recitation of the historical
materials, or it has determined that consideration of additional factors is
appropriate in any event. The Court does not admit the former; and of course
the latter, standing alone, would not establish uncertainty in the common law
as the prerequisite to looking beyond history in Fourth Amendment cases.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 1303.
109. See id. at 1302. The opinion states that
United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), held that probable cause to search
a car did not justify a body search of a passenger. And Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85 (1979), held that a search warrant for a tavern and its bartender did not
permit body searches of all the bar's patrons.
Id. (parallel citations omitted).
110. See id. The majority states that inDiRe, Justice Jackson "was referringprecisely to
'that distinction between property contained in clothing worn by a passenger and property
contained in a passenger's briefcase or purse.'" Id. at 1302 n.1. But see id. at 1306 n.4
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (speculating that Di Re would have been decided the same if the
contraband gas coupons at issue had been in a purse rather than a pocket); Marianne Means,
APurseIsMore Than a Container, SUNSENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr. 10,1999, at 13A
(arguing that purses should be given more protection against warrantless searches). See also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968) (indicating that even brief searches of outer clothing
may result in fear and humiliation to the person searched).
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privacy is less in a purse than in a trouser pocket."' In comparison,
the governmental interest in effective law enforcement is high.1" 2 A
rule contrary to the Court's holding might appreciably impair the
function of law enforcement efforts in combating crime113
3. "Passenger's Property" Rule Is Unacceptable
Though Houghton passed both prongs of the Court's test, not all
cases will. The majority announced a general rule that is practical
in application, thereby rejecting the Wyoming Supreme Court's
"passenger's property" rule as placing too high a burden on police
efforts in locating evidence and as encouraging litigation by
passenger-confederates." 4 The Wyoming Supreme Court's rule
would create a "safe zone" in passengers' belongings, subject to
abuse "by persons seeking to illegally transport contraband in
automobiles.... [Tlhe contraband would be immune from detection,
unless the police also develop probable cause specific to the passen-
ger.... Conversely, non-suspect passengers could.., falsely claim[]
ownership of the container.""5 The rule announced by the Wyoming
Supreme Court impermissibly imposes an additional limitation on
the permissible scope announced in Ross and "neglect[s] the
practical difficulties that police in the field will have drawing
additional lines or that courts will have in reviewing the lines they
draw."" '6 The majority felt this potential for fraud and abuse, along
111. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the Houghton majority's
distinction between searches of clothing and articles carried on the person).
112. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302.
113. See id. (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) (observing that ready
mobility creates risk of losing evidence while obtaining a warrant)). The majority also felt
passengers "will often be involved in a common enterprise with the driver." Id. But see United
Statesv. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77,82 (1993) (per curiam) (stating that criminal conspirators retain
expectation of privacy, regardless of their involvement in a criminal enterprise, such that the
criminality does not add to or detract from that privacy expectation).
114. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1303.
115. Brief of States of Kentucky et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 1998 WL
789361, at *9, Wyoming v. Houghton (No. 98-184).
116. Id. at *10.
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with the heavy burden placed on police, must be considered when
making Fourth Amendment determinations of reasonableness. 7
The Court criticized the dissent's "obviously owned by and in the
custody of" rule as "unadministrable" and not protective of personal
privacy." 8 Such a rule requires police to divide the car's occupants
into suspects and nonsuspects and then remember which container
belongs to whom. The practical result is police confusion as to which
container to search. If one container within the permissible search
is forgotten, and it contained contraband, the contraband may not
be seized. In the alternative, another container previously identified
as being in the custody of a passenger may inadvertently be
searched, and if it contained contraband, the evidence subsequently
would be excluded due to the illegality of the search." 9 The more
sensible rule, reasoned the majority, permits warrantless container
searches regardless of the presence of the owner if there is probable
cause to believe a container "may contain the contraband that the
officer has reason to believe is in the car."
120
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, advocated a modified
container-based distinction to be decided on a case-by-case basis.' 2'
The fact that the purse was found some distance from Houghton
reduced the likelihood that she or the driver had the opportunity to
place contraband in it. 122 The concurrence likened a search of a
purse to a personal body search, advancing the theory that the same
rule should be applied to both.123 If a wallet in a pocket is entitled to
117. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1303. But see id. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
State's legitimate interest in law enforcement does not outweigh the privacy concerns at
issue."); MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1948) (stating that police
inconvenience is insufficient to bypass the warrant requirement); Katz, supra note 15, at 189
(noting that in a large number of situations obtaining a warrant does not impose a great
burden on police or hinder operations).
118. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1303 n.2.
119. See Brief of States of Kentucky et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 1998
WL 789361, at *12, Wyoming v. Houghton (No. 98-184).
120. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304. The holding in Houghton was not limited to searches
for contraband. See id.
121. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
122. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
123. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). But see Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association
of Police Organizations in Support of Petitioner, 1998 WL 778371, at *17 n.4, Wyoming v.
Houghton (No. 98-184) (stating that men also carry purses); State v. Fix, 730 P.2d 601 (Or.
Ct. App. 1986) (permitting warrantless search of purse on passenger side of vehicle).
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heightened protection, the same should apply to a woman's purse.
The rule advanced in the concurrence, however, requires difficult
line-drawing as to which containers are in fact purses, though it
explicitly recognized that the Court previously rejected such a
distinction. No claim was made that purses, by status, are entitled
to heightened protection.124 Rather, the protection should be
qualified with a requirement that purses are only shielded from
warrantless vehicle searches if the purse is attached to the owner's
person.'25 In Houghton, the purse was not so attached, and thus not
entitled to special protection. 26 While the case-by-case determina-
tion advocated by the concurrence appears to protect more privacy,
police safety could be jeopardized by permitting passengers to keep
purses with them when ordered out of a vehicle. Additionally, what
qualifies as a purse remains undefined, thus, police would still be
faced with making on the spot determinations of what qualified as
a purse, even if attached to the person. Would a man's belt pack be
entitled to heightened protection?12' Furthermore, such an exemp-
tion for purses could encourage passenger-confederates to hide
contraband in the safe haven. Such an untoward result is what the
majority sought to prevent.
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in Ross, con-
cluded that automobile passengers' property is entitled to the same
heightened protection afforded to body searches. 21 The dissent
characterized the majority holding as a misapplication of the Ross
rule. In Ross the Court was concerned with the driver's privacy
interest in the integrity of his vehicle, 129 thus arguing that a
124. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304 (Breyer, J., concurring).
125. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that purses could be considered outer clothing
which are entitled to heightened protection from warrantless searches under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
126. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
127. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Brief ofAmicus Curiae National Association
of Police Organizations in Support of Petitioner, 1998 WL 778371, at *17 n.4, Wyoming v.
Houghton (No. 98-184) ("In today's society, one could easily argue that it is not unreasonable
to conclude that a male would own a 'purse-like' bag, especially someone hoping to evade a
law enforcement search for contraband.").
128. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1305 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens characterized the privacy issue in
Ross as concerning the driver's interest in the integrity of his vehicle in general, see id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting), in which there is a lesser expectation of privacy. See also United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
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passenger's privacy interest in his belongings in a car is not
diminished by the container's mere presence in a car.' The
government's interest in increased law enforcement efficiency does
not outweigh the substantial interest in privacy, thus, the dissent
advocated a modified version of the Wyoming Supreme Court's
"notice test."' The dissent would require either a warrant or
individualized probable cause before police may conduct a
warrantless search of passengers' belongings.
132
1. Passenger Searches Are Entitled to Heightened Protection
Justice Stevens felt Houghton should have been decided in accord
with cases that involved a passenger. 3 In all the cases applying the
automobile exception, the defendant was either "the operator of the
vehicle and in custody of the object of the search, or no question was
raised as to the defendant's ownership or custody."'34 In fact, only
one prior case addressed the search of a defendant passenger. 135 In
that case, as in Houghton, the probable cause information that the
search was based upon implicated only the driver.3 6 According to
Justice Stevens, the purse search at issue in Houghton should be
characterized as an intrusion of privacy, much like the serious
intrusiveness of a body search. 37 The dissent concluded that the
majority strayed from the precedential distinction between drivers
and passengers advanced in the only case directly on point, creating
a new rule that distinguishes between property held in a passen-
ger's clothing and the same property when held within a container
closely analogous to clothing. 
3
130. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1305-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 86-88
(discussing the Wyoming Supreme Court's proposed notice test).
132. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 1304-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1305 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
135. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1305 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Di
Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) (holding that the automobile exception did not apply to a search of
a passenger's person)).
136. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 andExparte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727 (1878)).
138. See id. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority creates a new
distinction between body searches and property searches, rather than relying on Di Re's
distinction between passengers and drivers). But see id. at 1301 n.1. The majority
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2. Majority Reasoning Misapplied Ross
The dissent argued thatRoss "disapproved of a possible container-
based distinction between a man's pocket and a woman's pocket-
book," such that if searches of pockets are prohibited, a search of a
purse is likewise impermissible.'39 Justice Stevens stressed Ross's
conclusion that probable cause must justify the search. If probable
cause extends to a specific container and justifies its search, it does
not extend to permit a general area search.40 The dissent fears the
majority's expansion of the Ross rule is susceptible to law enforce-
ment abuse.' The majority's reasoning concerning passenger-
confederates is objectionable, Justice Stevens explained, as the mere
"spatial association" between passenger and driver does not
necessarily mandate that the two are partners in a criminal
conspiracy. 141 The real danger in the majority's flawed reasoning is
the potential reach of Houghton's application that "would apparently
permit a warrantless search of a passenger's briefcase if there is
probable cause to believe the taxidriver had a syringe somewhere in
his vehicle."'43
3. Personal Privacy Interest Outweighs Government Interest
According to the dissent, a passenger's privacy interest in his
personal belongings is not compromised by the container's presence
within the confines of a vehicle.' 44 Rather, this presumption of guilt
by location refutes the precedential preference for individualized
characterizes the decision in Di Re as a distinction between body and property searches,
finding the decision rested on the intrusive nature of the search rather than Di Re's status
as a passenger or the importance of individualized suspicion. See id.
139. Id. at 1305 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (holding that containers
in vehicles that may conceal the object of the search are subject to probable cause-based
warrantless searches).
140. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1305 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (interpreting Ross as
disapproval of a pocket/purse distinction).
141. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens felt the majority decision permitted
an inverse application of Ross. Under Ross if probable cause was only applied to the
container, the police could not search the entire car. See id. at 1305-06 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
142. See id. at 1305 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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suspicion.'45 Justice Stevens felt police could apply an individualized
probable cause rule as easily as they could implement the majority
rule.14 The dissent concluded that the majority's extension of the
automobile exception now permits searches of passenger belongings
as a result of the driver's misdeeds.'47 For example, such an
extension would permit a warrantless search of all passengers in the
car if a diabetic driver is stopped for a faulty brake light and police
notice a hypodermic needle in his pocket. The police would also be
justified in searching all parts of the vehicle and any container in
the car capable of holding the object of the search. When probable
cause such as this proves unfounded, a passenger has already been
subjected to a serious intrusion into his personal privacy for a minor
traffic infraction committed by the driver.
4 8
V. IMPACT OF THE NEW RULE
When deciding Wyoming v. Houghton, the Court faced the
question of whether precedent permitted expansion of the automo-
bile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment
to allow police to conduct warrantless searches of automobile
passengers' belongings. In the past, each time a new, seemingly
clear rule was articulated, the practical implications seemed to
elude the Court. In each of the cases leading to Houghton, the Court
fearlessly announced supposed bright-line rules based on limited
factual scenarios.'49 What was never taken into consideration, or
perhaps was considered but dismissed, was the slippery slope
created by each new bright-line rule. The Court, apparently
forgetting its goal in Acevedo to prevent situations where more
specific probable cause information justified a more intrusive
search, announced in Houghton that a general search of a vehicle
and all its contents is permitted, even if probable cause attached to
only one person or container. 5 ° Before Houghton, if a police officer
had specific probable cause relating to just one bag, that one bag
was all he could search.'51 With the new Houghton rule, if probable
145. See id. at 1306 n.2 (Stevens J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "a rule requiring a warrant or
individualized probable cause to search passenger belongings is every bit as simple as the
Court's rule; it simply protects more privacy").
147. See id. at 1307 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., id. at 1304 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
150. See id. at 1303.
151. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); Ross, 456 U.S. at 823.
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cause exists to believe that one person is transporting drugs, then
the scope of the warrantless search includes all the occupants'
belongings located within the vehicle.'52 Thus, what was attractive
on paper is far less appealing in practice, at least for the common
citizen for whom the Fourth Amendment protections were designed.
Without this expansion, law enforcement efforts in combating
crime would be hindered, contraband could go undiscovered, and
guilty persons could go free. On the other hand, with this expansion,
citizens' personal privacy in an automobile is substantially dimin-
ished. The Court, balancing the relative interests, found that the
needs of law enforcement were greater than the citizens' minimal
expectation of privacy in a vehicle.'53 The Houghton decision,
therefore, has several potential ramifications: law enforcement
officers will more effectively execute their duties and already
overburdened lower courts will benefit from increased administra-
tive efficiency; citizens' personal privacy in vehicles will be virtually
eliminated; and the new rule will raise questions left unanswered
by Houghton that may create additional practical difficulties for
both police and lower courts.
A. Law Enforcement and Lower Courts
The expansion of the automobile exception in Houghton is touted
as a victory for law enforcement officers who face steadily increasing
danger from automobile occupants during routine traffic stops.'54
With this new rule, police have a bright-line rule to follow that does
not require them to make difficult, split-second determinations
concerning individualized probable cause, 55 nor does it require the
time and resources involved in procuring warrants. 56 The result is
a more efficient use of limited resources that enables police to focus
152. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1303.
153. See id. at 1303-04.
154. See Brief ofAmicus Curiae National Association of Police Organizations in Support
of Petitioner, 1998 WL 778371, at *17 n.4, Wyoming v. Houghton (No. 98-184); see also Joan
Biskupic, High Court Expands Car Search Authority; Passenger Property May Be Examined,
WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1999, at Al.
155. See Himstreet, supra note 19, at 217. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970).
156. See Himstreet, supra note 19, at 217 (stating that the rule conserves resources when
police do not need a warrant for every search or have to store every container seized).
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their efforts on more important issues, such as the war against
drugs.1
57
Before the Houghton decision, police could order passengers out
of a vehicle to ensure the safety of the officer. 5 ' Moreover, if police
were unsure whether they could search all containers found in a
general search when the vehicle was occupied by more than one
person, they could elect not to search containers of questionable
ownership and risk losing evidence.'59 If they chose to detain
passengers while awaiting a warrant, however, there was a risk
that the detention could amount to an unlawful seizure of the
person. 6 ° The simplicity of the majority rule will thus aid crime-
fighting efforts and protect individual officer safety, perhaps at the
expense of personal privacy rights.
Lower courts will also benefit from the administrative efficiency
of the new rule. Less time will be devoted to reviewing warrant
affidavits.' 6 ' Additionally, the clarity of the new rule should result
in greater uniformity of decisions, which would be less likely to be
reversed, thus eliminating the time and expense required for a new
trial on remand.162
With the automobile exception again expanded, though, there is
an increased possibility of police abuse. As Justice Stewart observed
in Chimel v. California,63 the worst scenario results not from the
guilty going free, but when the innocent are subjected to unreason-
able searches because they were not afforded the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. 64
157. See id.
158. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997).
159. See Brief of States of Kentucky et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 1998
WL 789361, at *9, Wyoming v. Houghton (No. 98-184).
160. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 169 (1978) (stating that a lengthy detention of a
person who is not under arrest may amount to a seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
161. See Himstreet, supra note 19, at 217. But seeAcevedo, 500 U.S. at 600-01 (stating that
"all society bears the cost of administrative inconvenience, a minuscule price to preserve its
freedom").
162. But cf Himstreet, supra note 19, at 217 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
772 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "heightened possibilities for error"
after Sanders would result in many overturned convictions).
163. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
164. See id. at 766 n.12; see also Sanders, 442 U.S. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In
Sanders, Justice Blackmun argued for a clear cut rule in order to prevent police uncertainty
or abuse. See id.
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B. Citizens' Personal Privacy Rights
Anytime the judiciary is removed from the Fourth Amendment
equation, "one of the citizenry's last safeguards against unreason-
able police conduct is lost."6 ' Police decisions concerning probable
cause in automobiles, unlike those made when preparing an
affidavit for a judicial warrant to search a home, are often made in
an instant, when officers lack the luxury of time to make informed
decisions due to the particular exigencies of the circumstances. 66
The less time the officers have to make a decision, the greater the
probability for error. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to
guard against such hurried judgment by interposing a neutral
judiciary between heat-of-the-moment police decisions and
citizens. 167 Even if a supposed victim of an unconstitutional search
may obtain a judicial determination on whether probable cause
justified the search, whether the particular state provides for an
expedient review of the case may depend on the fortuity of the
victim's zip code.
68
Additionally, the potential for police abuse of this expanded power
is significant. The Houghton rule only requires that officers
rationalize any probable cause belief that the car contains contra-
band before they initiate a complete search of the vehicle and all its
contents. 6 9 An officer could argue any number of reasons for
stopping a vehicle. So long as the car is lawfully stopped, police may
then form or fabricate the requisite probable cause to engage in an
intrusive search. 7 ° It seems the only guarantee that police will not
apply this expanded power inequitably under certain circumstances
is mere good faith on the part of individual officers.' 7 ' Good faith,
165. Himstreet, supra note 19, at 218.
166. See id.
167. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (stating that the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to restrain police by denying them the use of reasonable inference
because they are engaged in the competitive venture of combating crime).
168. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 766 n.12 (arguing that not all states provide "speedy"
suppression procedures).
169. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304; David E. Rovella, Court Broadens Auto Searches,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 19, 1999, at A6 (stating police can use this ruling as a pretext for searching
the entire car).
170. See Scott Goldstein, Defense Bar Vexed by Ruling on Passenger Search, N.J. LAW.,
Apr. 12, 1999, at 4 (expressing fear that overly aggressive police may abuse the new rule).
171. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,905 (1983) (holding that evidence will not be
suppressed under the exclusionary rule when officers act in good faith on reasonable but
mistaken belief they were authorized to perform acts). But see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
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however, provides minimal protection against the misapplication of
a rule that already substantially interferes with personal privacy
rights. Whenever the warrant requirement is waived the force of the
Exclusionary Rule is undermined in an area where its
purpose-deterrence of bad faith violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment-is clearly justified.
In Houghton, an avenue of crime fighting, detection of illegal
drugs, was made possible by the automobile exception: probable
cause that the driver possessed drugs and the mere presence of a
nonsuspect passenger's belongings in the car permit a warrantless
drug search of the entire car-a search unrelated to the original
probable cause for stopping the car. When the officer developed
probable cause that the driver had drugs, he was able to search
everyone's belongings in the car without any other justification. The
Court, however, only limited the application of Houghton to
automobiles, and said nothing about what kind of probable cause
may justify a warrantless search, nor did it place any specific
limitation on the definition of "object of the search" or require a
causal connection between the probable cause to search and the
object of the search.'72 This leaves the broad language, "object of the
search," open to police interpretation. 173 For example, if an officer
observed a car making an illegal "U-turn," he could stop the vehicle
and request the driver's license. If the driver was unable to produce
the license, the officer, interpreting Houghton, could order all of the
occupants out of the car and proceed to search for the license in the
places it could be located in the car. The scope of this search
presumably includes any passenger's belongings. Based on Hought-
on, if a search of the passenger's backpack revealed drugs, the
contraband would likely be admissible. Thus, since the Court failed
to specify or limit the amount of probable cause that justifies a
warrantless search, failed to specifically define "object of the
search," and did not require a causal connection between the
probable cause to search and the object of the search, the misappli-
cation of Houghton is likely.
798,808-09 (1982) (explaining that the automobile exception is only available if objective facts
would justify a judicially authorized warrant).
172. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304.
173. Id.
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C. Misinterpretation by a Lower Court
The likelihood of abuse of the Houghton rule by police and the
misinterpretation by lower courts was quickly proven when the
holding was applied in the context of issuing a parking violation.'74
In People v. Hart, police were summoned to a residential neighbor-
hood to investigate a van parked illegally on the side of the road.'75
Police approached the van and asked the defendant to produce
identification, so she searched the surrounding area, but was unable
to find her purse.'76 The defendant, along with her passenger, was
ordered out of the car. Though she objected, police searched her van
for her identification.'77 When they found her purse, they opened it
and found illegal drugs and paraphernalia as well as her identifica-
tion. 7 8
Relying on Houghton, the California Court of Appeal upheld the
constitutionality of the search.' 9 The majority confirmed that the
officers were authorized to require identification from the defen-
dant. 8 ° The court also concluded that officers were permitted to
detain the defendant pursuant to their authority under the Califor-
nia Vehicle Code.' With probable cause thus established, the court
turned to the defendant's diminished expectation of privacy in her
belongings and found that it was outweighed by the officers' concern
for their safety.'82 The court reasoned that, under Houghton, if the
vehicle is searchable, then all containers are searchable, stating that
""'[tihe critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner
of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and
seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.'""'83
The dissent in Hart correctly pointed out that the facts known to
the officer at the time he searched the defendant's purse did not give
174. People v. Hart, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
175. See id. at 764.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 764-65.
178. See id. at 765.
179. See id. at 769.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 767.
182. See id. at 768 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999)).
183. Id. at 769 (quotingHoughton, 119 S. Ct. at 1301, which is quotingZurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978)) (emphasis added).
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rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was dangerous or
that she possessed any drugs or weapons. 84 The presumed object of
the search was the defendant's identification. The dissent stated,
the majority holds that, ifBricker could search the van for weapons, on
that basis alone, he could search for weapons and identification in
defendant's purse which was in the van. This, according to the
majority, is because "it is well established that containers in a vehicle
are searchable if the vehicle is searchable...." But the law of search
and seizure has not yet gone that far. 85
The dissent read a limitation into Houghton, though rational and
clearly a valid consideration, that an officer's probable cause to
search a vehicle is based on police safety.8 ' Furthermore, the
dissent appears to recognize that the lack of a causal connection
between the probable cause to search the car and the object of the
search did not invalidate the search.' However, the Houghton
Court did not address either of these issues.
The Hart majority, based on its interpretation of Houghton, was
able to justify the officer's search based on probable cause that the
van could have contained weapons, even though the object of the
search was the driver's identification. 88 The court read Houghton
as allowing a general vehicle search if an officer may have feared for
his safety-even if the object of the search had no relation to thepost
hoc safety rationale.
Thus, what is most troubling with the new rule is the virtual
limitless nature of and potential circumstances in which it may be
applied. The foundations of the automobile exception rested, at a
minimum, on the exigency of the situation8 9 and required probable
cause to believe contraband was located in the vehicle. 90 But the
same probable cause justifies an intrusion to search for notably
different types of items and contraband, without qualification or
184. See id. at 771 (Hull, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 771 (Hull, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
186. See id. (Hull, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 772 (Hull, J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 768.
189. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing the exigency rationale for
the automobile exception).
190. See supra notes 54-67 (discussing the evolution of the probable cause standard of the
exception).
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relation to the probable cause to search.191 Perhaps a more sensible
standard would be to adopt the Houghton dissent's requirement of
individualized probable cause,' 92 a reasoning endorsed by the Court
in Acevedo, 193 qualified by permitting warrantless searches of
passenger belongings when the object of the search, such as a
weapon, poses a threat to the officers. If an officer was to lawfully
stop a vehicle and then observe ammunition on the front seat, such
probable cause to search the vehicle should extend to all passengers'
belongings in the vehicle as a measure of personal safety for the
officer. But, if the object of the search is drugs, unless the police
have individualized probable cause to believe that passengers'
belongings held the contraband object of the search, safety would
not dictate an immediate warrantless search of passengers'
belongings in the car.194
Police, in practice, have an assortment of safety measures at their
disposal, including authority to order the driver and all passengers
out of the car 195 and to conduct a limited frisk of those passengers
once outside of the car.' 96 Thus, Houghton should be modified to
apply to situations where the probable cause for the warrantless
search of a nonsuspect passenger's belongings is based on a
legitimate fear for officer safety where the object of the search is
dangerous contraband. Such a compromise would still serve the
interests of law enforcement, as they can always seek a warrant if
they lack individualized probable cause and the object of the search
does not pose an immediate threat.' 97 More significantly, such a
limitation would restore a modicum of personal privacy, at least to
passengers. Unfortunately, officer safety does not appear to be the
primary motivation of Houghton or the precedent upon which its
holding was based.
191. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
194. See generally Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1 (1977). Both of these cases were overruled by Acevedo. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at
579.
195. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,415 (1997) (stating that police may order
all occupants, including passengers, out of a vehicle); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047-
48 (1983) (stating that police may order driver out of car to protect their safety).
196. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
197. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VI. CONCLUSION
When it chose to review Wyoming v. Houghton, the Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether the scope of a search
under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment should be
expanded. Since its decision in Ross, the Court has shown a
willingness to expand the exception to apply to situations far beyond
its original justifications and intended scope. The Court responded
this time by deciding the exception also permitted warrantless
searches of automobile passengers' belongings, regardless of owner
culpability.
The majority's reasoning was two-fold. First, they determined that
such a search would have been historically reasonable. 198 Second,
they reasoned that a passenger, like a driver, has a reduced
expectation of privacy in her belongings that is less significant than
governmental interest in combating crime. 99 This standard affords
law enforcement great latitude in combating crime and eases the
warrant-issuing burden on lower courts. The most significant
impact, however, is the reduction of citizens' privacy in an automo-
bile. Thus, the goal the Court set forth in Acevedo-to protect more
privacy by permitting warrantless container searches where
probable cause attached to only the specific item, rather than
requiring a general search in order to justify the search of the
container in particular-rings hollow after Houghton. Prior to
Houghton, if the police had probable cause relating to only one
passenger and one bag, that was all they needed to search. After
Houghton, however, that same specific probable cause permits the
police to conduct a general area search, even if they know certain
items do not belong to the suspect. Houghton, therefore, should be
modified to permit warrantless searches of nonsuspect passengers'
belongings only when the probable cause for the search is premised
on a legitimate fear for officer safety and the object of the search is
contraband that could be used to harm police or others. If the
probable cause is based on nondangerous contraband then the police
should not be allowed to search nonsuspect passenger belongings
unless the officer has either probable cause to believe an individual
passenger possesses dangerous contraband or if the officer has
obtained a search warrant. The question remains: how many
198. See id. at 1300.
199. See id. at 1302.
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innocent passengers must fall victim to the nation's war on drugs
before the Court reevaluates its automobile exception jurispru-
dence? Until this question is addressed, people retain more Fourth
Amendment freedom walking.
Erin Morris Meadows
